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Abstract: The special position of the rotating Council Presidency has raised a long-standing 
debate  on  the  extent  to  which  this  function  allows  a  Member  State  to  exert  additional 
influence on European Union decision-making, in particular in external policy. This article 
argues that a broader and more differentiated study of Presidency influence could further this 
debate. In doing so, the article analyses the Polish Council Presidency (during the second half 
of 2011) and its influence on the European Union’s Eastern Partnership policies across three 
dimensions: (i) differences between influence on the agenda and influence on the contents of 
decisions, (ii) the forums (different levels in the Council and international forums) where the 
Presidency can exert influence, and (iii) different types of external policies, an area that has 
received relatively little scholarly attention thus far in the literature on the Presidency. The 
analysis shows that (i) the Presidency can determine the agenda to a certain extent, but the 
position  of  the  chair  does  not  allow  the  incumbent  to  exert  additional  influence  on  the 
contents of decisions; (ii) most Presidency influence of external policies is observed in the 
preparatory bodies of the Council, while at the ministerial or international level this influence 
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is  much  smaller;  and  (iii)  although  the  Presidency  can  play  a  rather  prominent  role  in 
organizing  multilateral  events,  this  rarely  amounts  to  real  political  influence.  In  turn,  the 
Presidency’s influence is most tangible in specific bilateral dossiers. 
Keywords: Political science; Poland; EU-East-Central Europe; East-Central Europe; agenda-
setting; Council of Ministers; COREPER; security/external; national interest. 
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Introduction 
While the formal tasks of the European Union’s (EU) rotating Council Presidency (hereafter 
the  Presidency)  are  rather  limited  and  administrative  (see  e.g.  Chenevière  2011),  the 
incumbent has evolved into an accountable and functional agent in EU decision-making, often 
fulfilling political tasks (see e.g. Westlake and Galloway 2004). The special position of the 
Presidency  has  led  to  intensive  academic  debate  on  whether  or  not  the  incumbent  exerts 
additional influence on EU decision-making. Some have claimed that holding the Presidency 
is of limited or no relevance for the influence of a Member State in the EU (e.g. Culley et al. 
2011;  Dewost  1984;  Ludlow  1993;  Hayes-Renshaw  and  Wallace  2006;  Vida  2010).  By 
contrast, others have shown that Member States holding the Presidency do exert additional EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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influence on decision-making (e.g. Arter 2000; Bjurulf 2001; Bunse 2009; Schalk et al. 2007; 
Tallberg 2004; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2007). The role of the Presidency has changed since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, especially in the area of external policies, 
where the abilities of the Presidency to  exert influence have been reduced (Charléty and 
Mangenot 2011; Drieskens et al. 2011; Vanhoonacker et al. 2011). However, although the 
Presidency’s  influence  is  thus  not  likely  to  be  high  across  the  board,  we  argue  that  the 
incumbent can still be an influential actor in EU decision-making on external policies (on 
external policies, see e.g. Hix and Høyland 2011). In doing so, our aim is not so much to 
unconditionally support either of the competing claims on Presidency influence, but rather to 
provide  a  more  nuanced  picture  of  Presidency  influence  by  unpacking  the  notion  of 
‘influence’. In particular, we argue that Presidency influence differs according to: (i) the type 
of influence, notably influence on the agenda vs. influence on the contents of decisions; (ii) 
different forums where the Presidency can exert influence, such as preparatory Council bodies 
or Council meetings; and (iii) different types of policies where the Presidency is possibly 
influential. 
The  article  examines  Presidency  influence  on  EU  external  policies  across  these  three 
dimensions through an analysis of the Polish Presidency (in the second half of 2011) and the 
EU’s  Eastern  Partnership  (EaP)  policies,  covering  Belarus,  Ukraine,  Moldova,  Georgia, 
Armenia, and  Azerbaijan. The EaP was  launched in  2009 at  the initiative of Poland and 
Sweden, with a view to increase cooperation and dialogue with the EU’s Eastern neighbours 
in  the  framework  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy.  It  consists  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral cooperation in a large number of policy areas, ranging from politically sensitive 
to  highly  technical  topics.  The  bilateral  track  with  the  individual  EaP  countries  includes 
financial  assistance,  as  well  as  negotiations  on  binding  treaties  such  as  Deep  and 
Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Areas  (DCFTA),  visa  facilitation  (at  a  later  stage  visa 
liberalization)  and  Association  Agreements.  The  European  Commission  (hereafter  the 
Commission) represents the EU in the negotiations on these treaties. The multilateral track of 
the EaP is less binding and includes multilateral meetings, conferences and summits, as well 
as thematic and technical cooperation platforms. Depending on the topic, these meetings are 
organized  by  the  Commission,  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  and  the 
Member States, and are often hosted by the EU Member State holding the Presidency. 
External policy has received relatively little attention so far in the literature compared with 
other  policy  domains  (for  exceptions,  see  Arter  2000;  Bunse  2009;  Tallberg  2006),  and 
Presidency  studies  have  been  mostly  preoccupied  with  the  Presidency’s  influence  on 
legislative work in the EU. As mentioned, the role of the Presidency in external policies has 
considerably  changed  with  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  Before  2009,  this  was  an  area  where  the 
Presidency could exert influence par excellence, since it fulfilled important tasks of external 
representation  for  the  EU.  At  present,  its  role  is  less  clear:  on  the  one  hand,  external 
representation (see e.g. Bunse et al. 2011; Vanhoonacker et  al. 2011) is now assumed at 
Heads  of  State  level  by  Herman  Van  Rompuy  (Permanent  President  of  the  European 
Council),  and  at  ministerial  level  by  Catherine  Ashton  (High  Representative  for  Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP)). Ashton EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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also heads the Foreign Affairs Council for all matters except trade. Most preparatory bodies 
for external policies are chaired by officials of the EEAS. On the other hand, the Presidency 
still chairs all other Council configurations and a high number of preparatory bodies, mostly 
in former first and third pillar issues, which often have an external dimension. Furthermore, 
the chair plays an increasingly important role in the relations between the Council and the 
other EU institutions (Drieskens et al. 2011). 
In this context, EaP policies are very relevant to study as a part of EU external policies: unlike 
‘classic’ foreign policy, cooperation with the Eastern neighbourhood includes a broad range 
of external policy areas where the Presidency still plays a role at different stages of policy-
making. Although there may be differences between the policy-specific contexts in which 
decisions are made (e.g. trade, transport, energy, visas), EaP policies generally constitute an 
area where a certain degree of Presidency influence is likely to be found. For the same reason, 
we  focus  on  the  Polish  Presidency,  one  of  the  first  Presidencies  after  the  Lisbon  Treaty 
entered into force. Earlier research has shown that Presidencies are most influential in areas 
that  are  highly  salient  to  them  (e.g.  Schalk  et  al.  2007;  Warntjen  2007).  As  one  of  the 
initiators of the EaP initiative and a well-known promoter of further integration between the 
EU and its Eastern neighbours (see e.g. Copsey and Pomorska 2010; EUObserver 2011a; 
Raik  and  Gromadzki  2006;  Szczepanik  2011),  it  was  no  surprise  that,  in  its  Presidency 
programme,  Poland  prioritized  closer  cooperation  with  the  region  through  various  policy 
areas in the framework of the EaP (Polish Presidency Website 2011f). In sum, we assume that 
if the Presidency still exerts any influence on external policies, for the Polish Presidency this 
will most likely be observed in EaP policies. We thus selected a Presidency and a part of 
external policies where we expect some influence of the incumbent. That said, the overall aim 
of the article is not to unveil causal relationships or to make generalizable claims as in classic 
case study research, but rather to illustrate that a broader and more differentiated study of 
possible Presidency influence is necessary to gain new insights into the debate on Presidency 
influence. 
In what follows, we first reflect on how influence is defined and measured in the article. We 
then outline the research puzzle by offering three sets of competing hypotheses. These will be 
discussed  in  the  subsequent  section,  which  consists  of  an  exhaustive  examination  of  the 
influence of the Polish Presidency on the EaP. The conclusions reflect on the main findings 
that (i) the Presidency has a considerable influence on the external agenda but not on the 
contents of external policies, (ii) most influence is exerted in the preparatory Council bodies, 
and  (iii)  the  incumbent  generally  exerts  influence  on  bilateral  rather  than  on  multilateral 
policies. 
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1.   Studying Presidency influence 
1.1.  Defining and measuring influence 
It goes without saying that the definition of ‘influence’ and its relation to ‘power’ are highly 
contested in the literature. Many authors (for a review, see Guzzini 2000) have shown that 
control over power resources does not necessarily translate into control over outcomes. Power 
is not always converted into influence and, alternatively, actors may exert influence even 
without being powerful. Building on Bunse’s work (2009: 5), we define Presidency influence 
as intentionally changing an outcome from what it would have been in the absence of an 
action. An ‘outcome’ in this definition can refer to a topic that is (not) placed on the agenda, 
as well as to a final decision that is (not) made. This definition is agent-centred: influence is 
seen as an intentional process. Our research therefore focuses on the actions of the actors 
executing Presidency tasks and their influence on decision-making. Our method allows us to 
observe expressions of the so-called ‘first face’ of power – making another actor do what 
he/she would otherwise not do – as well as the ‘second face’ of power – bringing about non-
decisions  (see  e.g.  Bachrach  and  Baratz  1962).  However,  taking  into  account  the  strong 
preferences of Poland to further EU cooperation with the EaP in as many policy areas as 
possible, we do not expect Polish attempts to inhibit decision-making. In this article, we do 
not study the ‘third face’ of power – defining the frame of reference in which others shape 
their preferences (Lukes 1974), since this is more related to structure than agency. Moreover, 
it  is  unlikely  that  every  Presidency  would  be  able  to  substantially  change  the  frame  of 
reference for the Member States and the institutions within a short period of six months. 
The  method  we  apply  for  measuring  influence  is  based  on  the  EAR  method  (Ego/Alter 
perception,  Researcher’s  analysis),  which  was  developed  by  Arts  and  Verschuren  (1999). 
Information on Ego and Alter perceptions, typically gathered during elite interviews, refer to 
assessments by key agents of their own (Ego) or other’s (Alter) influence in decision-making. 
The Researcher’s analysis is a validity check of those perceptions. It is a qualitative method, 
based on the triangulation of data collected from interviews and other primary and secondary 
sources. It has the advantage that it mitigates the tendency to underestimate influence when 
using  process  tracing  and  to  overestimate  influence  with  the  mere  analysis  of  preference 
realization (see also Dür 2008). 
Arts and Verschuren (1999: 419–21) have furthermore designed a classification system for 
assessing the level of political influence (PI). They propose to express PI as the product of 
three factors: (i) the degree of goal achievement of an actor (GA) – how much of the actor’s 
goals are reflected in the outcome?, (ii) the extent to which GA can be ascribed to this actor 
(AS) – what was the contribution of the actor to the outcome in relation to the contribution of 
other actors?, and (iii) the political relevance (PR) of the outcome – how politically important 
and  how  binding  is  the  outcome?  Therefore,  PI=GAxASxPR.  For  each  component,  they 
foresee scores between 0 and 3. From this formula, a number of scores are possible, to be 
translated in verbal assessments ranging from ‘no influence’ to ‘great influence.’ EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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For this article, we modified the method on three points. First, the numbers (0, 1, 2, 3) are 
replaced by labels; ‘no’, ‘limited’, ‘substantial’, and ‘high’, in order to avoid creating the 
impression that influence is quantified or measured on an interval scale, while in reality we 
make a qualitative assessment on an ordinal scale. Second, the ‘formula’ is changed so that 
the measurement of influence corresponds better to the definition of influence applied in this 
article. If, in the original method, an outcome highly reflects the preferences of the chair and 
has high political relevance, but can be ascribed to the Presidency only to a limited extent – 
e.g. because there was a broad consensus and the decision would be taken anyway  – the 
Presidency’s influence would still be considered substantial, which is an overestimation. To 
avoid this, we apply the rule-of-thumb that the level of Presidency influence cannot be higher 
than the extent to which an outcome is ascribed to the incumbent. Third, we argue that the 
operationalization of PR should be both broader and more specific. On the one hand, we 
include political novelty in the operationalization; the degree of innovation (in terms of topics 
on the EU agenda or the nature of EU policies) arguably contributes to the political relevance 
of an outcome. On the other hand, we do not consider to what extent an outcome is legally 
binding, but instead assess its political impact on EU policies; also non-binding outcomes can 
have an impact. 
Data  for  the  assessment  of  GA,  AS,  and  PR  were  gathered  from  official  documents, 
secondary sources, and interviews. Between January and November 2012, 22 anonymous, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from Poland, other Member States, 
the  Commission,  the  EEAS,  and  the  Council  Secretariat.  The  indicators  of  influence  are 
operationalized as shown in Table 1, and the degree of influence is established according to 
the following rules: 
1.  If any of the components GA, AS, or PR is found to be ‘no’, there is ‘no PI’. 
2.  If GA, AS and PR have identical levels, PI equals this level. 
3.  If the levels of GA, AS, and PR are all different, ranging between limited and high, 
there was ‘substantial PI’. 
4.  If there are two identical levels for GA, AS, or PR, then PI equals the level of those two 
identical scores. 
5.  Rules 3 and 4 are applied on the condition that the level of PI is never higher than the 
extent to which the outcome can be ascribed to the Presidency. This means that, if AS 
scores the lowest, PI equals AS. 
   EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-005a.htm    7 
 
Table 1: Indicators for Presidency influence 
 
Indicator  Level  Description 
G
o
a
l
 
A
c
h
i
e
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
(
G
A
)
  No  The outcome entirely contradicts the Presidency’s preferences. 
Limited 
The outcome partially corresponds to and partially contradicts 
the Presidency’s preferences. 
Substantial 
The outcome is not the most preferred result for the Presidency, 
but does not contradict its preferences. 
High 
The outcome reflects the Presidency’s preferences as much as 
was legally and practically feasible. 
A
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
(
A
S
)
 
No 
The Presidency was not involved in the outcome as a chair, or 
was involved but had no role in developing the outcome. 
Limited 
The Presidency was involved as a chair to a limited extent, but 
the outcome was mainly developed by other actors. 
Substantial 
The Presidency was involved as a chair and steered the 
outcome, but other actors also played a role in developing the 
outcome. 
High 
The Presidency was involved as a chair and it is unlikely that 
the outcome would have been the same if another country was 
in the chair. 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
R
e
l
e
v
a
n
c
e
 
(
P
R
)
 
No 
The outcome is of little or no political importance, is not novel 
in terms of EU agenda or policies, and has little or no political 
impact. 
Limited 
The outcome is politically important or novel in terms of EU 
agenda or policies, but has no considerable political impact. 
Substantial 
The outcome has a considerable political impact, although it is 
of limited political importance or novelty in terms of EU 
agenda or policies. 
High 
The outcome has a considerable political impact and is 
politically important or novel in terms of EU agenda or 
policies. 
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As stated supra, the debate on Presidency influence (on external policies) can be enriched by 
a more nuanced conceptualization of ‘influence’. No straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer can 
be given to the question as to whether the Presidency exerts influence; instead, one should 
distinguish  between types  of influence, forums of decision-making,  and types  of external 
policies. In the next section, we identify gaps in the literature on these aspects and formulate 
two competing hypotheses for each of them, which will be tested in the empirical analysis. 
1.2.  Competing hypotheses on Presidency influence 
The  first  distinction  we  make  is  between  agendas  and  contents  of  decisions.  A  political 
agenda is a set of issues that receive serious consideration (Princen 2009), a process which 
does not necessarily result in tangible decisions. Finalized decisions are more permanent and 
long-lasting. Taking into account the division of powers in the EU, agenda-setting by the 
Presidency should not be understood as independently putting new issues on the agenda, but 
rather as pressurizing the Commission or the HR/VP to take certain initiatives and, once 
formal proposals are made, speeding up decision-making on issues that are favoured by the 
incumbent. Existing studies of Presidency influence discuss either the Presidency’s ability to 
determine  the  agenda  (e.g.  Tallberg  2003;  Warntjen  2007)  or  influence  the  contents  of 
decisions (e.g. Bjurulf and Elgström 2004; Schalk et al. 2007; Tallberg 2004; Warntjen 2008). 
Thus far, scholars have failed to look into how Presidency influence may differ between 
agenda-setting  and  determining  the  contents  of  decisions.  In  addition,  authors  who  have 
observed influence on the contents of decisions have focused mainly on legislative issues. 
Hence, it is not clear whether their findings also apply to external policies, which are often 
non-legislative. Two competing hypotheses can be formulated in this regard. On the one hand, 
one could argue that since agendas have less practical consequences than finalized decisions, 
the Member States and institutions grant the Presidency more discretionary power in defining 
the agenda than during the actual decision-making:  
HYP1-A:  The  Presidency  exerts  more  influence  on  the  agenda  than  on  the  contents  of 
decisions. 
On the other hand, the (external) agenda is formally prepared by the Commission and the 
EEAS. At later stages, when shaping the actual decisions, the chair can have some influence 
while fulfilling its tasks of mediation and representation between the delegations and between 
the Council and the other institutions: 
HYP1-B: The Presidency has more influence on the contents of decisions than on the agenda. 
Secondly, we distinguish between the different forums – i.e. Working Parties, the Committee 
of  Permanent  Representatives  (Coreper),  Council  meetings,  and  international  forums  (i.e. 
contacts  with  third  parties  such  as  countries  or  international  organizations)  –  where  the 
Presidency may (or may not) exert influence. The agency of the Presidency is ‘located’ in 
several venues, the incumbent is  not  a monolithic bloc.  A Member State’s  Presidency  is 
managed at different levels and by a large number of officials with different backgrounds. EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2013-005a.htm    9 
 
These  actors’  capacities  for  influencing  agendas  and  decisions  are  not  necessarily  equal. 
Although  Wurzel  (1996;  2004)  has  described  the  workings  of  different  levels  in  Council 
decision-making, the question as to what extent the forum affects Presidency influence is as 
yet unanswered. Also on this point, two competing hypotheses can be formulated. 
Most decisions in the Council are taken at the preparatory level (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
2006). Only few issues, normally the most complex and sensitive ones, reach the Ministers’ 
negotiation table. At this level, holding the Presidency would not add much to a Member 
State’s influence; the Ministers are not expected to allow any party to use a temporary role for 
exerting disproportionate influence in such dossiers. This hypothesis is especially plausible 
for external policies, since the incumbent Member State no longer heads the Foreign Affairs 
Council while it continues to chair Coreper, some Working Parties preparing the Foreign 
Affairs Council (Vanhoonacker  et  al.  2011), and most other Working Parties  –  including 
those  discussing  external  aspects  of  internal  EU  policies.  At  international  forums,  e.g.  in 
direct  contacts  with  third  countries’  governments,  the  Presidency  has  little  room  for 
manoeuvre, since the EU is formally represented by the EEAS and the Commission. HYP2-A 
can be called the ‘low level’ hypothesis: 
HYP2-A: The incumbent exerts most influence in the preparatory bodies of the Council, and 
least influence at the ministerial level or at international forums. 
In turn, HYP2-B focuses on the higher levels. Complex issues under negotiation by Ministers 
require  intensive  mediation,  which  may  place  the  representatives  of  the  Presidency  in  a 
privileged position to leave their mark. In practice, this only concerns the forums where the 
Presidency chairs the meetings, i.e. all Council formations (including their external aspects) 
except the Foreign Affairs Council. With regard to third parties, it is known that the EU’s 
partners do not always accept the new institutional architecture of the EU and may prefer to 
negotiate with the Presidency or with individual Member States rather than with the HR/VP 
or the Commission (see e.g. Drieskens et al. 2011). The de facto Presidency influence as an 
external representative may thus be considerable. The ‘high level’ hypothesis is as follows: 
HYP2-B: The Presidency exerts most influence in the Council and at international forums, 
and least influence in the preparatory bodies. 
Finally,  we  identify  different  types  of  external  policies.  The  variety  of  external  policies 
includes  bilateral/multilateral  cooperation  in  a  broad  range  of  policy  areas  (e.g.  trade, 
transport, energy, visas), each with specific decision-making mechanisms. The Presidency 
may not be equally influential on all types of policies. For this article, the main distinction is 
made  between  bilateral  and  multilateral  EaP  policies,  in  parallel  with  the  bilateral  and 
multilateral tracks the EU develops for the EaP (see supra). Under these main categories, we 
further differentiate between policy areas. Again, we develop two contradicting hypotheses on 
this  issue.  For  one  part,  it  can  be  argued  that  multilateral  policies  involve  less  formal 
commitments than bilateral policies, making the Member States and the institutions less eager 
to control the Presidency with regard to multilateral cooperation. Thus,  EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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HYP3-A:  The  Presidency  exerts  more  influence  on  multilateral  policies  than  on  bilateral 
policies.  
Conversely, bilateral cooperation is the most ‘legislative’ type of external policy, whereas 
multilateral policies involve less binding commitments. It is for legislative issues – although 
for internal EU policies – that previous studies have observed substantial influence of the 
chair  (e.g.  Bjurulf  and  Elgström  2004;  Tallberg  2004;  Warntjen  2007).  In  such  dossiers, 
mediation  between  the  delegations  and  the  institutions  may  be  required,  which  can  be 
employed by the chair to steer the outcome closer to its own preferences. Consequently;  
HYP3-B:  The  Presidency  exerts  more  influence  on  bilateral  policies  than  on  multilateral 
policies. 
2.  The Eastern Partnership during the Polish Presidency 
In this section, the above-mentioned competing hypotheses are examined through an analysis 
of the policies, strategic choices, and institutional aspects of EU-EaP relations in the second 
half of 2011, with a focus on the influence of the Polish Presidency. Poland’s activeness in 
EaP/external policies was not strictly limited to the six months of its Presidency period; Polish 
representatives started working towards their Presidency long before July 2011. However, 
there are no indications that this happened in the framework of the so-called ‘trio’ it formed 
with Denmark and Cyprus. The preparations for the Polish Presidency – which was the first in 
this trio – took place in consultation with other countries such as Hungary, and during the 
Danish and Cypriot Presidencies the EaP was much less prominent on the EU’s agenda than 
in 2011. In addition, none of the interviewees described the trio cooperation as relevant for 
achieving Poland’s goals with regard to the EaP. 
The results of the study are summarized in Table 2; the policies are discussed in more detail 
in the following sections. The upper part of Table 2 includes an overview of the bilateral 
policies and the lower part summarizes the multilateral policies. The ‘Issue’ column refers to 
the policy issue that was (not) developed under the Polish Presidency. ‘Political influence’ 
sums up the indicators for influence and the overall level of influence for each issue, and 
mentions the type of influence (if any). Finally, the ‘Forum’ column indicates which forum(s) 
played a key role and thus where the Presidency exerted (no) influence. 
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Table 2: Influence of the Polish Presidency on Eastern Partnership policies 
  Issue  Political influence  Forum 
B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
  GA  AS  PR  PI   
Armenia, visa  High  Subst.  Lim. 
Substantial 
(agenda) 
Coreper 
Azerbaijan, 
visa 
High  Subst.  Lim. 
Substantial 
(agenda) 
Coreper 
Ukraine, 
Association 
Agreement 
Subst.  Lim.  Subst. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
International, 
Gymnich Council, 
Coreper 
Moldova, 
trade 
High  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Trade Policy 
Committee 
Georgia, 
trade 
High  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Trade Policy 
Committee 
Azerbaijan, 
energy 
Subst.  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Coreper 
Azerbaijan, 
transport 
Subst.  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Council 
Belarus  No  No  No  No  Coreper 
Caucasus, 
declarations/ 
visits, 
Cooperation 
Councils 
High.  No  No/ Lim.  No 
Council, European 
Parliament, 
International 
M
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
Transport  High  Subst.  Lim. 
Substantial 
(agenda) 
Council, 
International 
EED  Subst.  High  Subst.  Substantial  Minister, Coreper EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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(agenda) 
EaP summit  Lim.  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Coreper 
Energy  High  Lim.  Lim. 
Limited 
(agenda) 
Council 
CORLEAP  Lim.  No  Lim.  No 
Committee of the 
Regions, 
International 
EaP  Business 
Forum 
High  No  No  No  International 
Civil  Society 
Forum 
Lim.  No  Lim.  No  International 
EU-EaP 
Science, 
Education 
Ministers’ 
conference 
Lim.  High  No  No  International 
EU-EaP 
Economy 
Ministers’ 
conference 
Lim.  High  No  No  International 
EU-EaP 
Agriculture 
Minister’s 
conference 
Lim.  High  No  No  International 
Police 
training, 
drugs 
combating 
No  High  No  No  International 
A glance at the table reveals that, in some dossiers related to the EaP, outcomes would indeed 
have been different if Poland had not been in the chair. The Presidency exerted limited or 
substantial influence on some external policies, but we did not observe high influence. Thus, 
the Presidency  can be  a crucial  agent  in  external  policy-making  although its  influence is EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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restricted  in  the  post-Lisbon  structure,  where  other  agents  such  as  the  HR/VP  and  the 
Commission have become the main external representatives of the EU and play a key role in 
the development of external policies. 
In the next three sections, we discuss the Presidency’s influence for every issue, structured 
according to the degree of influence. Subsequently, we summarize the findings with regard to 
types of influence, forums, and types of policies. 
2.1.  Substantial Presidency influence 
The  Polish  Presidency  exerted  substantial  influence  in  four  dossiers,  both  bilateral  and 
multilateral.  The first  two were in  bilateral  visa policy towards  Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
From  the  start  of  their  Presidency,  Polish  members  of  the  Permanent  Representation 
pressurized  the  Commission  to  propose  starting  negotiations  with  both  countries  on  visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements (Interview 22). Once the proposals were received 
(European Commission 2011c; 2011d), Tombiński, Poland’s EU Ambassador, immediately 
initiated discussions at Coreper; the negotiation mandates were adopted by the Council in 
December (Council of the European Union 2011j). The Presidency’s goal to increase mobility 
between the EU and EaP countries was achieved as much as was feasible at that moment. 
Ascription to the Presidency was substantial: although the negotiations were expected to be 
opened in the future, the mandates were adopted earlier than was planned, and Tombiński 
overcame considerable resistance from some Member States who are traditionally reluctant to 
facilitate  visa  requirements  for  citizens  of  unstable  countries  (Interview  3;  Interview  4; 
Interview 5). The political relevance of negotiation mandates is limited, however: mandates 
can be of high political importance and changes can affect the agenda, but they have no 
political  impact  as  such  since  they  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  final  result  of  the 
negotiations. 
The third instance of substantial influence is in multilateral transport cooperation with the 
EaP, a relatively new topic in this framework. The most important event here was the EU-EaP 
Transport Ministers’ conference in Kraków (European Commission 2011f). It succeeded a 
Commission Communication of July 2011 on transport cooperation with the EU’s neighbours 
(European Commission 2011a), which proposed a series of initiatives to integrate the EU and 
EaP countries’ markets, improve infrastructure connections, and establish a permanent body 
that monitors transport cooperation, the Eastern Partnership Transport Panel. In October, the 
Council, chaired by Grabarczyk, the Polish Minister of Infrastructure, endorsed the proposals 
and prepared the ministerial conference in Kraków (Council of the European Union 2011d). 
During the conference, the Azerbaijani delegation at some point threatened not to sign the 
joint declaration if no reference was made to its territorial integrity with respect to Nagorno-
Karabakh. After bilateral negotiations between Grabarczyk and his Azerbaijani counterpart, 
the latter agreed to sign the declaration on the condition that reference was made to territorial 
integrity  in  the  internal  meeting  report  (Interview  7;  Interview  15;  Interview  18).  The 
declaration  (Council  of  the  European  Union  2011e)  mentioned  closer  market  integration, 
increased levels of security, safety, environmental and social standards in transport, improved EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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interconnections, and the launch of the Eastern Partnership Transport Panel, which would 
report on the results of its work during the next ministerial meeting to be organized on the 
proposal of the Commission and the Presidency. Poland achieved its goal of putting transport 
cooperation with the EaP on the EU agenda. Both the Council conclusions and the Kraków 
conference resulted from Polish initiatives (Interview 2; Interview 7), although they depended 
on  the  Commission  Communication.  The  political  relevance  of  these  events  is  limited, 
however, since they have not produced tangible results thus far. 
Finally, the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy, a fund to support 
democratic movements and political parties abroad, is noteworthy. In early 2011, before the 
start  of  the  Presidency,  Poland’s  Foreign  Minister  Sikorski  proposed  to  set  up  a  flexible 
instrument for democracy promotion, primarily – but not exclusively – focused on the EU’s 
neighbourhood. He pressurized Ashton to make reference to the Endowment in the review of 
the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (Interview  19;  European  Commission/HRVP  2011). 
However,  not  all  Member  States  were  convinced  of  the  Endowment’s  viability  and 
desirability. The main concerns were related to funding, a possible loss of sovereignty for 
individual  countries  in  defining  their  priorities  for  democracy  promotion,  and  suspected 
overlap  with  existing  instruments.  Also,  the  intention  to  support  political  parties  was 
controversial  (Interview  4;  Interview  5).  Despite  this  scepticism,  Poland’s  Coreper 
Ambassador put the issue on the agenda as often as was needed to reach unanimity on the 
idea  (Interview  1;  Interview  4;  Interview  5).  A  political  agreement  on  the  European 
Endowment  for  Democracy  was  achieved  in  Coreper  in  December  (Polish  Presidency 
Website 2011b). Its administrative expenses will be covered by the Commission, while its 
activities should be funded by voluntary contributions from European national governments 
(EurActiv 2013). Although the Endowment’s resources are very modest compared to other 
funds for EU democracy promotion (Youngs and Brudzinska 2012), it has substantial political 
relevance, since the possibility to support political parties abroad is new in the EU’s approach. 
Putting the Endowment on the agenda and obtaining a political agreement was a substantial 
achievement of the Presidency’s objectives, although Poland had to make serious concessions 
on its structure and financing in order to make a political agreement acceptable (Interview 4; 
Nasieniak  2012).  It  can  to  a  high  degree  be  ascribed  to  the  actions  of  the  Presidency, 
considering the initial  resistance  from  some Member States.  The two  main actors in  this 
dossier were Sikorski, who launched the idea at the right moment – at the beginning of the 
Arab  Spring  and  just  before  the  start  of  the  Polish  Presidency  –  and  Tombiński,  who 
employed  his  position  to  put  the  idea  repeatedly  on  the  Coreper  agenda  (Interview  1; 
Interview 4; Interview 19; Interview 21). 
2.2.  Limited Presidency influence 
We observed limited influence of the Polish Presidency in seven dossiers, mostly in bilateral 
policies. 
First, in EU-Ukraine relations, the future Association Agreement, including a DCFTA, was 
high on the agenda throughout 2011. At the start of the Polish Presidency, negotiations on the EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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Association Agreement were nearing conclusion (EUObserver 2011c). However, the arrest 
and  subsequent  conviction  of  Ukraine’s  former  Prime  Minister  Timoshenko  was  widely 
criticized  as  being  politically  motivated  and  strained  EU-Ukraine  relations  (EUObserver 
2011f). It became increasingly unlikely that the agreement would be initialled as planned 
during the EU-Ukraine  summit in  December 2011. Polish officials,  who strongly support 
Ukraine’s integration in the EU, tried to unblock the situation in order to have concrete results 
on  this  issue  during  their  Presidency.  Poland's  President  Komorowski,  former  President 
Kwaśniewski,  and  Sikorski  paid  several  visits  to  Ukraine  to  discuss  the  Association 
Agreement at the highest level, where they consistently emphasized the need for reforms in 
Ukraine (EUObserver, 2011e; Polish MFA 2011; President of Poland 2011a; 2011b; 2011c). 
In addition, Sikorski put the issue on the agenda during the Gymnich meeting in September 
(EUObserver  2011d).  These  efforts  did  not  entail  improved  political  relations,  although 
technical negotiations on the DCFTA continued and were finalized in October (Centre for 
Eastern Studies 2011). This process was led by the Commission, however; the Presidency was 
not involved. The Association Agreement was finally not initialled during the EU-Ukraine 
summit, but the participants – Van Rompuy, Commission President Barroso, and Ukrainian 
President Yanukovich – announced that they had reached a common understanding on its 
contents  and  that  it  should  be  technically  completed  and  initialled  as  soon  as  possible 
(Council of the European Union 2011k). The Polish Presidency thus reached its goals to a 
substantial degree: the dialogue between the EU and Ukraine continued, and the Association 
Agreement was kept on the agenda. The decision to agree on the contents without initialling 
the Agreement was relevant for not losing momentum. However, those developments can be 
ascribed to the Presidency only to a limited extent. During the technical negotiations and 
during the summit, Poland was not present. The Presidency could not do much more than try 
to  mediate  with  Ukraine  at  a  high  level  and  give  the  Association  Agreement  a  sense  of 
urgency,  which  Tombiński  did  by  repeatedly  putting  the  issue  on  the  Coreper  agenda 
(Interview 4; Interview 9; Interview 16). 
Bilateral  trade  relations  advanced  with  two  other  EaP  countries:  Moldova  and  Georgia. 
Association Agreements with both countries have been under negotiation since 2010, but the 
launch  of  DCFTA  talks  was  made  conditional  on  the  fulfilment  of  a  set  of  key 
recommendations.  After  a  positive  assessment  by  the  Commission,  the  Trade  Policy 
Committee,  chaired  by  Nogaj,  the  Director  of  Poland’s  Trade  Policy  Department  in  the 
Economy  Ministry,  approved  mandates  for  the  Commission  on  DCFTA  negotiations 
(European Commission 2011h). Progress in trade relations with Moldova and Georgia was a 
priority of Poland and the mandate was an important step in this direction. However, this 
decision can be ascribed to the Presidency only to a limited extent: Nogaj did accelerate the 
adoption of negotiation mandates (Interview 4; Interview 5), but the key recommendations 
had  been  adopted  much  earlier  and  the  decision  was  dependent  on  the  Commission’s 
assessment  (Interview  20).  Like  other  negotiation  mandates,  this  decision  is  of  limited 
political relevance in the context of this article. 
The fourth and fifth cases of limited Presidency influence were in bilateral relations of the EU 
with Azerbaijan. On the one hand, following a visit in January 2011 by Barroso and Energy EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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Commissioner Oettinger to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, discussions started in Coreper on a 
negotiation  mandate  for  a  binding  treaty  to  build  a  trans-Caspian  gas  pipeline  system. 
Unanimity on the mandate was reached in July (Polish Presidency Website 2011d), and the 
mandate was formally approved by the Council in September (2011a). On the other hand, the 
Council (2011d) adopted a negotiation mandate for the Commission on an aviation agreement 
with Azerbaijan in October. Both in transport and energy policy, the Presidency’s goals were 
achieved in that the basis for further cooperation with Azerbaijan was generally broadened 
(Interview 15) and concrete steps were taken in diversifying energy supplies to the EU. Yet, 
as  for the other negotiation mandates discussed in  this  article, their political  relevance is 
limited, and they can be ascribed to the Presidency only as far as the speed of adoption is 
concerned (Interview 6). 
Sixth, the Presidency exerted limited influence on the results of the biennial multilateral EaP 
summit. This event was initially planned for May 2011, under the Hungarian Presidency. 
However, Hungary’s Coreper Ambassador and his Polish counterpart informed the EEAS in 
February that the event was postponed until September (Interview 8), allegedly because the 
planned date clashed with G8/G20 and OECD meetings, as well as with Georgia’s national 
holiday on 26 May (Interview 11). Many officials believe that there was more behind this 
decision than just incompatible dates, including pressure from Poland, which saw hosting this 
summit as a prestige project during its Presidency (Interview 8; Interview 9; Interview 10), 
and the Arab Spring, which put other priorities on the EU agenda (Interview 5; Interview 10; 
Vida 2011). Although the Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers agreed to jointly prepare and 
co-host the summit (Hungarian Presidency Website 2011), Poland managed to present it as a 
‘Polish’ event, which was especially obvious during the press conference: Poland’s Prime 
Minister spoke before Van Rompuy and Barroso (EU TV Newsroom 2011). The Presidency’s 
goal achievement with regard to the summit was limited. On the one hand, the joint statement 
(Council of the European Union 2011c) adopted at the end of the summit was ambitious and 
gave political impetus to deeper cooperation in a broad range of policy areas, including trade, 
visas,  energy,  transport,  agriculture,  environment,  communication  technologies,  education, 
and culture. On the other hand, however, not all goals of the Presidency were achieved. The 
joint statement ‘acknowledge[d] the European aspirations and the European choice of some 
partners’ (Council of the European Union 2011c), which is a much more careful formulation 
than an explicit membership prospect and did not go as far as Poland and some EaP members 
would have liked (EUObserver 2011b). In addition, Belarus boycotted the summit; Poland 
had favoured the highest possible representation and tried to agree in Coreper II to invite 
Belarus' President Lukashenka despite the EU’s travel ban against him (Interview 1; Interview 
5), but this was unacceptable for some Member States (Interview 4). The EU finally invited 
Belarus’ Foreign Minister, who declined the invitation (EurActiv 2011b) and left Belarus’ 
chair empty at the summit. In response to the deteriorating human rights, democracy, and rule 
of law situation and the worsening of media freedom in Belarus, the EU members adopted a 
separate declaration in which they expressed their concern about these developments (Council 
of the European Union 2011b). A third failure was that this document did not mention the 
human rights situation in other EaP countries, and it was not co-signed by them. The results of EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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the  summit  can  be  ascribed  to  the  Presidency  to  a  limited  extent,  mainly  due  to  legal-
institutional restrictions:  Poland hosted the event  but  Van Rompuy chaired the high-level 
meetings. Some preparations, inter alia, on the joint statement and the invitation to Belarus 
took place in Coreper under the chairmanship of Tombiński, but most preparatory work was 
done in  the Working  Party on Eastern Europe  and Central  Asia (COEST) (Interview 12; 
Interview 13), chaired by an EEAS official. The negotiations with the EaP countries on the 
declaration on human rights were formally led by Ashton (Interview 17; Interview 21). The 
political relevance of the summit was also limited. Although it undeniably contributed to 
increased  attention  within  the  EU  to  the  region,  and  laid  the  foundations  for  future 
cooperation (see e.g. Kucharczyk and Łada 2012), its results had limited political impact on 
EU-EaP relations. 
Finally, the Presidency exerted (very) limited influence on the agenda for energy cooperation 
with third countries. Polish representatives worked hard to have Council conclusions adopted 
on the external aspect of energy security (2011f), which was an important priority for Poland. 
The Council conclusions were based on a Commission Communication of September (2011b) 
and endorsed four priority areas, covering the whole world – thus only in part related to the 
EaP. The adoption of Council conclusions was considered the Presidency’s most important 
success  in  energy policy  (Interview 2), Poland’s  goals  were fully achieved on this  point. 
However, this can be ascribed to the Presidency only to a limited extent: while it is possible 
that the conclusions would have been adopted later if Poland had not been in the chair, they 
reflected a rather broad consensus among the Member States, which had been prepared in part 
by the Hungarian Presidency and the European Council of February 2011 (Interview 6). The 
political relevance of the Council conclusions was limited, since they had no direct political 
impact. 
2.3.  No Presidency influence 
There  were  also  various  developments  in  EU-EaP  relations,  mostly  multilateral  but  also 
bilateral, where we observed no Presidency influence. 
In  the  case  of  Belarus,  which  does  not  participate  in  the  bilateral  track  of  the  EaP,  the 
Presidency did not achieve its goals: although Poland supports developing ties with Belarus, 
notably with civil society organizations (Interview 15; Interview 16; EUObserver, 2011a), 
EU-Belarus relations did not improve throughout 2011, quite the contrary (see supra). Other 
events  in  bilateral  relations  with  countries  in  the  South  Caucasus  cannot  be  ascribed  to 
Poland, and were not mentioned in any of the interviews as examples of Presidency influence. 
The  Presidency  played  no  role  in  Ashton’s  visit  to  the  South  Caucasus  (European 
Commission 2011g) or in the European Parliament resolution calling for more assistance to 
Georgia and a recognition of Georgia as a European State and South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
occupied  territories  (European  Parliament  2011).  Also,  when  the  European  Parliament’s 
President  and  Ashton  rejected  the  constitutional  and  legal  framework  in  which  the 
Presidential elections of Abkhazia (EurActiv, 2011, 29 August) and South Ossetia (EurActiv EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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2011c) took place, the Presidency was not involved, although their statements corresponded 
to the Polish point of view. 
The EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Councils, which Poland’s State Secretary 
for the EU co-chaired on behalf of Ashton (Council of the European Union 2011g; 2011h), 
did not have political relevance: the participants merely took stock of the progress in bilateral 
relations and reiterated what had been discussed during the EaP summit. 
Poland organized and hosted a high number of multilateral events related to the EaP that we 
do not consider as instances of Presidency influence. In three of these events, Poland did not 
play  a special role other than being the host  country, so  these cannot  be ascribed to the 
Presidency: the inaugural meeting of the Conference of Regional and Local authorities in the 
EaP (CORLEAP) in Poznań was organized at the initiative of the Committee of the Regions 
(Committee of the Regions 2011), and the third Civil Society Forum in Poznań (European 
External Action Service 2011) is an annual event. The idea to hold an EaP Business Forum, 
which was organized during the EaP summit in September (ENPI Info Centre 2011), was 
launched long before 2011, although Poland was indeed the first Presidency to organize this 
event. Yet the meeting did not yield any tangible results. The Polish Presidency also took a 
number of EaP-related initiatives in policy areas that it considered important, but these had no 
political  relevance  as  defined  in  this  article.  Poland  wished  to  set  up  an  EU-EaP  police 
training  programme,  for  which  it  organized  and  hosted  a  preparatory  meeting  (Polish 
Presidency Website 2011g). However, this was not pursued: the Commission Communication 
that was expected in October 2011 was published in December 2012 (European Commission 
2012).  The  Presidency  also  organized  meetings  of  EU  and  EaP  Education  and  Science 
Ministers (Polish Presidency Website 2011c), of Economy Ministers (Economic Forum 2011) 
and of Agriculture Ministers (Polish Presidency Website 2011e), as well as a conference on 
combating drug-related crime (Polish Presidency Website 2011a) and a high-level seminar on 
customs cooperation with the EaP (European Commission 2011e), which prepared Council 
conclusions on this issue (Council of the European Union 2011i). Since these events were 
mainly aimed at exchanging experiences and did not have political impact thus far, they lack 
political relevance and do not reflect Presidency influence. In sum, although these multilateral 
events organized and/or hosted by the Polish Presidency did entail (temporarily) increased 
attention of the EU members and institutions to the EaP, they can as such not be regarded as 
examples of Presidency influence. 
2.4.   Types of influence, forums, and types of policies 
The analysis of EaP policies during the second semester of 2011 shows how the Presidency 
exerted limited and even substantial influence in some dossiers. It is striking to observe that 
Poland influenced only the agenda and not the contents of decisions. These findings support 
the hypothesis that the Presidency has more influence on the agenda than on the contents of 
decisions  (HYP1-A),  and  thus  disconfirm  previously  drawn  conclusions  in  the  literature, 
which studied internal EU decision-making (see supra), with regard to the chair’s influence on 
the contents of decisions in external policies. Interestingly, Commission officials do not see EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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the Presidency’s agenda-setting capacities as problematic; on the contrary, they consider it an 
advantage that ‘their’ policy areas are regularly promoted at the political level, as long as this 
does  not  lead  to  radical  changes  in  policy  implementation  (Interview  18;  Interview  19; 
Interview 20; Interview 21). Presidencies with a favourable attitude toward certain policy 
areas constitute a window of opportunity (Kingdon 1995) for Commission officials working 
on those areas. As a result, Presidency influence is, to a certain extent, facilitated by the 
Commission. 
As for the second set of competing hypotheses, on the forums in which the incumbent exerts 
influence, we observed most instances of Presidency influence in the preparatory Council 
bodies that it chairs, notably in Coreper and to a lesser extent in the Trade Policy Committee. 
This confirms the ‘low level’ hypothesis that the Presidency’s influence is the largest in the 
preparatory  bodies  (HYP2-A):  civil  servants  and  technical  experts  generally  have  more 
opportunities to influence the agenda than politicians. There were only a few dossiers where 
the Presidency exerted influence at the Ministers’ level. However, most of these dossiers had 
been  extensively  discussed  in  the  preparatory  bodies.  In  sum,  the  degree  of  Presidency 
influence is inversely proportional to the level of decision-making. Only in one case, the 
establishment  of  the  European  Endowment  for  Democracy,  did  we  notice  the  opposite 
dynamic: in this dossier, Minister Sikorski made a difference and left his personal mark on the 
idea of the Endowment and its further development. 
Finally, on the hypotheses regarding the type of external policy, four remarks should be made. 
Firstly,  the  Polish  Presidency  played  a  prominent  role  in  a  large  number  of  multilateral 
initiatives, mainly by hosting and (co-)organizing numerous conferences and other meetings. 
However,  although  the  whole  of  these  developments  gave  a  political  boost  to  EU-EaP 
relations, the individual events should not be viewed as instances of Presidency influence on 
external policies, since they were mostly not followed up and/or have not produced tangible 
results thus far. The initiatives are potentially relevant for future EU-EaP relations and they 
can lead to new practices or intensified cooperation, but until now there have been no signs 
that  such  an  impact  may  be  observed  in  the  foreseeable  future.  Secondly,  the  Polish 
Presidency exerted influence on many aspects of the bilateral agendas despite the fact that the 
Commission and the HR/VP are key actors in bilateral relations with third countries. It is 
important to note that the type of policies where the Presidency has most influence – bilateral 
policies  –  is  the  most  ‘legislative’:  it  consists  of  (negotiations  on)  binding  treaties.  The 
political  influence  of  the  Presidency  thus  mostly  plays  in  the  legislative  part  of  external 
policies, and less in non-legislative policies. Thirdly, nearly all bilateral policies in which the 
Presidency exerted influence were related to negotiation mandates for the Commission. This 
shows that although the incumbent can play an important role in setting the bilateral agenda, it 
cannot do so on its own. The Presidency does not have formal competences to negotiate or 
speak on behalf of the EU with the EaP countries, but it can facilitate and steer the work of 
the institutions. Within the scope of this article, it is impossible to make a detailed assessment 
of  the  inter-institutional  dynamics  between  the  Presidency  and  other  actors  such  as  the 
HR/VP,  Commissioners,  the  Council  Secretariat,  and  the  European  Parliament.  Inter-
institutional dynamics in external policies, which have been researched mostly in the pre-EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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Lisbon institutional setting (e.g. Dijkstra 2011; Vanhoonacker et al. 2010), could be the focus 
of future research. Fourthly and finally, there are no clear-cut differences between policy 
areas (e.g. trade, visas, energy, etc.), unlike the variation between bilateral and multilateral 
policies. Influence was observed both in technical dossiers, such as transport cooperation, and 
in  politically  sensitive  issues,  including  visa  facilitation.  The  room  for  manoeuvre  of  the 
Presidency  thus  depends  on  the  Commission  rather  than  on  the  policy  area:  Poland  was 
‘lucky’ that the Commission issued most planned Communications and proposals in time and 
thus ‘allowed’ the Presidency to exert some influence (Interview 14). When the Commission 
did  not  publish  documents  that  were  expected,  as  was  the  case  for  the  police  training 
programme,  the  Presidency  could  not  push  the  issue  forward.  These  findings  generally 
support the hypothesis that the Presidency exerts more influence on bilateral EU-EaP policies 
than  on  multilateral  policies  (HYP3-B),  although  the  large  number  of  Presidency-driven 
multilateral initiatives also (temporarily) put the EaP higher on the EU’s agenda. 
Conclusion 
This article showed that the Presidency can exert influence on external policies, but that this 
influence differs according to (i) the type of influence, (ii) the forums in which decisions are 
made,  and  (iii)  the  type  of  external  policy.  First,  we  illustrated  that  the  Presidency  seat 
allowed Polish officials to exert additional influence on the EaP agenda of various external 
policies, but not on the contents of the actual decisions made on these policies. The incumbent 
can act as a facilitator and to a limited extent as an initiator of external policies, but it is not a 
more influential decision-maker than when it is not in the chair. Second, we unpacked the 
Presidency as an agent by looking at the forums where it operates. The Presidency’s agency 
does  not  work  in  the  same  way  at  all  levels:  generally  speaking,  the  Presidency’s  civil 
servants in the preparatory bodies of the Council exert the most influence, while the influence 
of  Presidency  representatives  decreases  as  dossiers  move  to  higher  (political/ministerial) 
levels. Third, although the incumbent has considerable room for manoeuvre in organizing 
multilateral events on different topics, we found that the Presidency was mostly influential in 
bilateral agendas. 
Referring back to the debate on whether or not the Presidency exerts additional influence on 
EU (external) policies,  we argue that no straightforward  claims can be made, since ‘the’ 
influence of ‘the’ Presidency on ‘the’ external policies of the EU does not exist as such. 
Instead,  Presidencies  are  managed  by  a  large  number  of  officials  and  politicians  who 
intervene in various forums, exerting different types of influence on a broad range of policies 
in an institutional structure that constrains the abilities of chairpersons to be influential. This 
institutional  structure  has  thoroughly  changed  with  the  Lisbon  Treaty  and  decreased  the 
abilities of the Presidency to exert influence on decision-making, especially in the area of 
external policies. Although on the basis of this article we cannot draw strong conclusions on 
the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, we did illustrate that the Presidency can still have some 
influence and that, at least in some instances, representatives of the incumbent country can EIoP               © 2013 by Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie 
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play a crucial role in external policy-making. Furthermore, within the context of this article it 
was impossible to elaborate on the inter-institutional dynamics between the Presidency and 
the  EU  institutions.  However,  the  results  of  this  research  show  that  while  the  Polish 
Presidency  faced  opposition  in  the  Council  in  some  dossiers,  this  was  not  the  case  with 
respect to the Commission. On the contrary, Commission officials consider it an advantage 
that the policy areas on which they work are regularly promoted at the political level. 
Because of Poland’s interest in the EaP, the Polish Presidency tried to advance the EaP in as 
many policy areas as possible. As Polish officials thus had no interest in impeding decision-
making related to the EU’s Eastern neighbours during the Presidency, we have – as expected 
– found no instances of the ‘second face’ of power, only instances of the ‘first face’ of power. 
If  future  studies  were  to  systematically  examine  country,  issue,  and/or  context-specific 
conditions under which the Presidency exerts influence, they may also observe cases in which 
non-decisions are brought about. 
More  generally,  the  present  study  could  inspire  further  research  in  three  ways.  First,  it 
underlines the importance of agency in the EU institutions and encourages further study and 
theorizing of the role of actors in other settings as well, including (comparative) analyses of 
other Presidencies with different country-specific characteristics or other types of policies, but 
also agency and decision-making mechanisms in other EU institutions. Second, the method 
applied for measuring Presidency influence – based on an assessment of goal achievement, 
ascription, and political relevance – could be used in future studies on the influence of the 
Presidency, but also of other types of agents in different settings in or outside the EU. Finally, 
following the article’s main aim to provide a more nuanced picture of Presidency influence by 
unpacking the Presidency’s influence along three dimensions (type of influence, forums, type 
of  policy),  further  research  could  apply  this  analytical  distinction  when  examining  the 
influence of other Presidencies and in other policy areas. Also in internal EU policies, the 
Presidency may be found to exert different types of influence depending on the institutional 
environment and the policy area. 
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